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ABSTRACT                                                                
 
 
This paper provides an assessment of Africa’s first “bad bank,” the Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (AMCON), and its role in resolving non-performing loans (NPLs) in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. It is a case study that primarily investigates the effectiveness of AMCON in addressing 
the banking crisis in Nigeria based on evidence from different sources ranging from economic 
indicators to media reports and newspaper interviews. The establishment of AMCON in 2010 helped 
to resolve the non-performing loans crisis in Nigerian banks, through a transparent removal of toxic 
assets and by providing the affected banks with a fresh start, while eliciting a minimal moral hazard 
effect as far as financial institutions were concerned.  Other African countries such as Ghana are now 
considering adopting a similar “bad bank” solution. However, the AMCON solution has been at a 
considerable cost to the Nigerian taxpayers as AMCON has been running at a huge loss, partly funded 
by the taxpayer through the government.  Data analysed in the study cover the period from 2008 to 
2013. The analysis showed that the AMCON solution was successful as the balance-sheet sanitization 
effort helped to neutralize many of the banking sector’s non-performing loans, and spurred 
improvements in the sector’s aggregate loan book quality within its first two years. As at December 
2012, AMCON had purchased more than 95% of the banking sector’s NPLs, leaving the industry’s NPLs 
at less than 5%. This offered banks a fresh start and the leeway to concentrate on building new and 
sustainable lending models. This outcome of this study supports prior empirical work which only 
examined bad banks in developed economies (the USA and Europe) and in the Asia Pacific. It should 
be noted that the “bad bank” concept is new to Africa and so there is very little empirical work on this 
topic. This study contributes to the discussion by its exposition on the overall positive trends in 
Nigeria’s banking sector post-crisis and the impressive growth in bank credit, GDP and the equity 
market after the financial crisis. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
An unprecedented financial and credit crisis took place in 2007-2009, beginning in the U.S. subprime 
mortgage arena. The spill-over effect of the crisis left the global financial markets in a state of 
disarray.  By 2009, global economic growth had shrunk, for the second consecutive year, below the 
historical average of 4.5% (Financial Derivatives Company, 2013:2). The crisis led to an increase in 
troubled assets and a rise in corporate default rates, triggering a series of write-offs and resulting in 
the failure of many world-renowned financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers (Pinedo, 2009:1). 
The crisis left several economies at the brink of bankruptcy, including Nigeria. This study attempts to 
investigate the effectiveness of Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) in resolving the 
resultant banking crisis in Nigeria. 
 
Laeven and Valencia (2010:3-5) noted that among the many causes of financial crises are the 
following: a combination of unsustainable macroeconomic policies including excessive credit booms; 
large capital inflows and current account deficits; unsustainable public debt; and balance sheet 
fragilities, all combined with a variety of political and economic constraints. Laeven and Valencia 
(2010:3-5) also mentioned that in many such crises, currency and maturity mismatches and off-
balance sheet operations of the banking sector are prominent.  
 
The aftermath of the crisis caused several disruptions to emerging market economies (EMEs). 
According to Soludo (2009:7), the impact of the banking crisis on Nigeria is evidenced by sharp 
declines in cross-border financing, increases in sovereign spreads and pressures in the domestic 
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markets and in foreign exchange markets. Several Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries were affected 
to various degrees, with their banking systems nearing total collapse. In Nigeria, as with many African 
countries, the first-round effect was not felt on the economy (Sanusi, 2010:2-5). Sanusi (2010) opined 
further that the sound macroeconomic policies implemented by the country helped to temper the 
effect of the crisis.  Also, the country’s banking system was less integrated with the global financial 
market. Further, the Nigerian banking system operated with simple financial products and had strong 
capitalization following the 2005 bank recapitalization exercise. However, Nigeria became affected as 
the recession in advanced countries deepened, with consequences for the economy as a whole and 
the financial sector in particular.  
 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Non-performing loans (NPLs) were at the heart of the banking crisis that engulfed the Nigerian 
financial markets during 2008–10. A sharp deterioration in the quality of banks’ assets followed, 
thereafter resulting in liquidity constraints and capital adequacy problem across all the Nigerian banks 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2011:1). International Monetary Fund (2013:11) idenitified the following 
factors as contributing to the Nigerian crisis identified by the authorities include:  
i. Critical gaps in regulatory framework and regulations. 
ii. Macro-economic instability caused by large and sudden capital inflows. 
iii. Lack of investor and consumer sophistication. 
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iv. Inadequate disclosure and transparency about the financial position of banks. 
v. Unstructured governance and weak management processes within the CBN. 
vi. Uneven supervision and enforcement, and weaknesses in the overall business environment. 
The government, through the central bank, played a leading role in financial system restructuring, 
including strengthening the legal and regulatory framework, injecting public funds, and setting up a 
new institution for crisis management. 
 
These findings are in line with the view of Fofack (2005:1), who wrote that there is a greater 
probability of a banking crisis occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa countries as a result of non-performing 
loan-related risks. Fofack (2005) stated that this is mainly because the region’s banking system is 
dominated by a few large banks. Healing the banking system is therefore a crucial task for the central 
banks to ensure sustained recovery. Posen and Véron (2009:1) suggest that any lingering fragility of a 
country’s banking industry would cause persistent disruption and/or misallocation of bank credit, 
resulting in a significant negative impact on economic activity which in turn discourages investment. 
Also, Posen and Véron (2009) believe that recurring banking sector fragility will not only reduce 
aggregate demand but also harm productivity growth since certain investment and R&D cycles will 
probably be skipped, with capital tending to be misallocated to lower-return projects, and causing 
long-term unemployment.  
 
There is some consensus that asset management companies (AMCs) have been a consistently 
successful tool employed by financial institutions and policymakers to resolve insolvent and non-
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viable financial institutions, restructure distressed but viable financial institutions, dispose of troubled 
assets and repair NPLs in banking systems. Aggarwal, Aritomo, Brenna and Clark et al. (2012:3) believe 
that creating an asset management agency (in other words, using the “bad bank” model) has become 
the preferred solution. This is validated by Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:8) who stated that 
theoretically, by removing NPLs from banks and transferring them to AMCs, banks regain the capacity 
to intermediate funds in the economy. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009:9) state that during some prior 
crises, “bad banks” have been used successfully by financial institutions and policymakers to manage 
and restructure troubled assets on bank’s balance sheets. Schäfer and Zimmermann (2009:9) 
observed that when the banks are freed of their toxic assets then the threat of bankruptcy, the risk of 
a reduction in lending due to a lack of capital, and other attendant negative effects, can be minimized 
or eliminated. 
  
A large body of empirical work has examined “bad banks” in developed economies (the US and 
Europe) and in the Asia Pacific region. However, the bad bank concept is relatively new to Africa with 
very little empirical work, if any, as Nigeria’s AMCON is the pioneer public-owned bad bank on the 
continent.  
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of the Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (AMCON) in addressing the banking crisis in Nigeria, particularly in resolving non-performing 
loans in the aftermath of the 2008/9 financial crisis.  
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This study is intended to be very instructive for the rest of Africa and other developing economies 
especially now that other African countries are considering adopting the bad bank solution to address 
their current banking crisis, with Ghana considering the AMC design similar to AMCON’s.  The major 
contribution of this research study to this discussion is the exposition on resulting trends in Nigeria’s 
banking sector post-crisis and the extent to which credit growth, GDP growth and equity market size 
after the financial crisis are explained by the bad bank solution.  
 
The outcome of this research study is expected to assist policymakers, academics, banking 
institutions, and regulatory bodies in Sub Saharan Africa specifically, as well as globally, to understand 
the impact of “bad bank” intervention on reported bad debts and NPL ratios in Banks. This study is 
also expected to improve understanding of how the “bad bank” solution uniquely contributes to 
reviving the banking system’s credit intermediation activities. 
 
The next section of this study, Chapter 2, begins with a literature review on bad banks. Chapter 3 
describes the research approach adopted in this study. This is immediately followed with a discussion 
of Nigeria’s financial system and the role played by AMCON to mitigate the impact of the banking 
crisis on the country’s banking sector (Chapter 4). The financial performance and costs of AMCON on 
the Nigerian economy are analysed in Chapter 5 while conclusions, recommendations and areas for 
further study are presented in Chapter 6. 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the review of relevant literature on bad bank structuresand other core 
aspects of the topic under study. Various issues are covered such as the designs and structures of bad 
banks, cross-country experiences, and possible rationales that lead to the establishment of bad banks. 
The chapter thus presents the conceptual and theoretical basis for the study. 
 
2.2 Systemic Banking Crisis 
Laeven and Valencia (2010:7) explained that financial crises can be both damaging and contagious, 
often prompting the need for swift policy responses. They stated that historically, financial crises led 
affected countries into deep recessions and sharp current account reversals with some crises turning 
out to be contagious and rapidly spreading to other countries with no apparent vulnerabilities. 
According to Waxman and Annamalai (1999:3), a “systemic financial crisis” could be defined as a 
widespread banking failure affecting over 20% of a country’s banking system in terms of total deposits 
and which results in creditors, depositors, and shareholders all asking for their money from the banks 
at the same time. A systemic run (banking panic) occurs when bank creditors at all, or several number 
of banks in the banking system suddenly ask that their debt claims be converted into cash to such an 
extent that the banks have to close down or suspend convertibility of their debt into cash (Calomiris & 
Gorton, 1991:5).  
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According to Laeven and Valencia (2010:7), a banking crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are 
met:  
 
(a) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank 
runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations). 
(b) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the 
banking system.  
Laeven and Valencia (2010) stated further that policy interventions in the banking sector to be 
significant if at least three out of the following six measures have been used: extensive liquidity 
support (5% of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents); bank restructuring gross costs (at least 3% of 
GDP); significant bank nationalizations; significant guarantees put in place; significant asset purchases 
(at least 5% of GDP); and deposit freezes and/or bank holidays.  
 
Systemic banking crises, when they occur, are usually difficult to handle because they simultaneously 
cast negative sentiments and doubt on all banks. Caprio and Klingebiel (1997:5-6) claim that handling 
such crises is even more difficult for less-developed and transition countries. According to Terada-
Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:5-6), some of the developing countries that experienced systemic crisis 
in 1997 include Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia. Caprio and Klingebiel (1997:5-6) state that 
these developing countries lack deep capital markets that can spread the costs of insolvency over a 
number of years. Also, they are often unable to deal with resulting bank insolvencies and may resort 
to an inflation tax to finance banks' losses. Waxman and Annamalai (1999:12) argued that the 
experiences of these East Asian countries show that systemic financial crises are inevitable in 
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developing countries. As such, Waxman and Annamalai (1999:12) advised that these countries must 
focus on early containment of such crisis. Caprio and Klingbiel (1997:6) state further that failure to 
confront the problem will only aggravate the banking crisis. This view is supported by Gandrud and 
Hallerberg (2013:5) who claim that, during such a systemic crisis, debt-holders will doubt the bank’s 
ability to meet its obligations to them. The next section describes the tools that could be used by a 
central bank to deal with such a systemic banking crisis. 
 
2.3 Central bank instruments to deal with the crisis 
Major central banks have taken unprecedented policy actions to address the financial crisis in their 
various jurisdictions. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009:5) report that regulators and policymakers 
across the globe have gone to unprecedented lengths to prevent a total collapse of the financial 
system and also to maintain the solvency of financial institutions. The responses are usually led by a 
country’s central bank and by regional monetary authorities. For example, this was done in 2010 by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) to address the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro-Zone.  
 
The monetary policy rate (also referred to as the short-term interest rate by Svensson, 2009:1) has 
remained the primary monetary policy instrument to ensure financial stability, with communication 
generally playing a supporting role. In Emerging Market Economies, according to Galati and Moessner 
(2013:9-11) and Laeven and Valencia (2010:7), policymakers usually respond to the banking crisis with 
macro-prudential tools such as: 
 increasing domestic and foreign currency financing,  
 provision of long-term liquidity to banks in support of lending, and 
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 changes in regulations and reserve requirements, and changes in policy rates . 
 
However, according to some writers (Bernanke & Reinhart, 2004; Gertler & Karadi, 2011; and Laeven 
& Valencia, 2010), the use of non-conventional tools (which have recently generated much discourse 
in both research literature and policy debates) can be suitable. This is particularly true for extreme 
situations when policy rates become ineffective.  For example, close to the zero lower bound (ZLB) as 
interest rates cannot fall below 0%.  
Explaining the zero lower bound theory, Svensson (2009:1) began by noting that the main tool of 
conventional monetary policy is the short-term interest rate, set by the Central Bank. He argued that 
if inflation is low and economic growth negative, then the Central Bank will cut interest rates to 
stimulate demand and create higher economic growth. However, there may come a point where 
interest rates have fallen to zero and therefore, cannot fall any further. This is the zero lower bound 
(ZLB) rate: here, interest rates have fallen as far as they can. Note that it is considered not practical to 
have negative nominal interest rates. After all, nobody would lend money at a negative interest rate; a 
person would be better off just holding cash. This means the Central Bank can no longer use interest 
rates to stimulate the economy. This is also referred to as a liquidity trap. 
Other unconventional tools that have been widely mentioned include: 
 nationalization,  
 asset management companies (bad bank),  
 asset guarantee programmes, 
 purchase of financial assets, and 
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 lowering of long-term interest rates in order to stabilize specific markets, including those for 
mortgages. 
 
In discussing probable decisions by government and regulators, Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:6-7) 
present the Figure 2.1 below, where the potential action to support the banking system could be to 
provide liquidity assistance, recapitalize, add to existing accounts or establish an asset management 
agency. 
 
Figure 2.1: Banking Crisis Nested Decision-making 
 
Source: Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013) 
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2.4 The Bad Bank 
2.4.1 “Bad Bank Solution” to Financial System Restructuring 
Even before the 2009 economic crisis, bad banks were deployed as an intervention tool by an 
increasing number of financial institutions and governments. Among the countries where bad banks 
were deployed were the United States in the late 1980s, Malaysia in the 1990s, and countries in 
Europe such as Ireland and Germany. After the adoption of the bad bank solution in Nigeria, the 
number of NPLs which expanded during that country’s crisis has declined. 
Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:1) and Pinedo (2009:1) agreed that a resolution strategy that is often 
recommended and used by governments to restore the banking sector after crises is to establish a 
public asset management company (AMC or “bad bank”) that acquires, manages and disposes of 
impaired bank assets.  
Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:3) stated that when debts prove too much for their owners, with 
an increasing incidence of huge unpaid loans on a bank’s books, many look for a structural solution. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009:9) state that during some crises, bad banks were used successfully by 
financial institutions and policymakers to manage and restructure troubled assets on a bank’s balance 
sheets. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009:9) established that crisis after crisis, bad banks were 
consistently and successfully employed by banks and policymakers to dispose of eligible distressed 
assets. 
Aggarwal et al. (2012:3) believe that creating an asset management agency, in other words using the 
“bad bank model,” has become the preferred solution.  
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Schäfer and Zimmermann (2009:9) reported that as soon as the affected banks are freed from their 
bad assets portfolio, then there is usually a reduction and possibly an elimination of the negative 
effects associated with the constant need to write-down asset values, the threat of bankruptcy, 
reduction in lending due to a lack of capital and the readiness to take excessive risks at the expense of 
creditors and the general public.  
 
According to Ingves, Seelig and Dong He (2004:5), AMCs with clearly defined, focused, and consistent 
goals are more likely to be effective. Ingves, Seelig and Dong He (2004:5) suggested that these goals 
could be to achieve the following: (a) the resolution of insolvent and non-viable financial institutions; 
(b) the restructuring of distressed but viable financial institutions; and (c), the privatization of 
government-owned and government-intervened banks. Ingves, Seelig and Dong He (2004:5) stated 
further that there are only a few cases where AMCs help to achieve certain social objectives such as in 
the United States where one of the goals of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) included provision 
of affordable housing by giving preference to buyers willing to meet programme goals. 
 
2.4.2 Cross-Sectional Country Analysis of Previous Bad Banks 
Over the years, several countries have used the bad bank solution to address their financial crises. 
According to Aggarwal et al. (2012:3), as many as fifteen bad banks have been created in recent times. 
For example, in Asia, countries that have used bad banks to solve their NPL problems include 
Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the People’s Republic of China which established four bad 
banks. In Central Asia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyz Republic have all used the AMC solution at 
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some point. In Europe, Sweden, Spain, Ireland and the UK have used the bad bank solution as recently 
as the late 2000s while the US also implemented this solution twice to address its financial crisis.  
Figure 2.2 below gives a cross-country presentation of selected AMCs and their respective summary.  
23 
 
Figure 2.2: Selected Historical Bad Banks by Country 
Country Bad Bank(s) Summary 
Ireland 
 
Sunrise: 2009 
Name: NAMA 
 
NAMA is a state-run bad bank established to acquire local real-estate 
credits that are mostly long-term assets, taking them off bank’s balance 
sheet in order to revive lending in the Irish economy 
 
Volume: EUR90billion. 
   
USA Sunrise: 1989 
Name: Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) 
 
 
 
 
Sunrise: 2008 
Name: TARP 
 
 
Sunrise: 2008 
Name: Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) 
 
RTC was established to resolve the loans crisis and large losses afflicting 
Savings & Loans (S&L) institutions in the US in late 1980s. RTC took over 
747 bankrupt S&L institutions between 1989 and 1995. 
 
Volume: US$394 billion. 
 
TARP was established after the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 was passed to alleviate the US subprime mortgage crisis. 
Institutions rescued included GM, Citigroup and AIG. TARP addressed the 
US Treasury’s urgent need to restart lending, specifically by capital 
injection and not by purchase of bad asset. 
 
Volume: US$475 billion. 
   
Spain Sunrise: 2012 
Name: SAREB 
 
Sociedad de Gestion de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuracion 
Bancaria (SAREB) was established to acquire troubled assets from 4 
Spanish banking institutions. Owned 55% by private investors and 45% 
by the state, SAREB has a 15 year life and has already taken over assets 
in excess of EUR40billion.  
 
Volume: EUR100 billion. 
   
Sweden Sunrise: 1992 
Name: Securum and Retriva 
Securum and Retriva were both created in the early 1990s to resolve the 
toxic assets problem in Sweden and encourage flow of deposits and 
market confidence. 
Securum took over about 21% of Nordbanken bad assets (about 3000 
NPLs in 1,274 troubled companies) while Retriva acquired 45% of the 
distressed assets in Gota Bank (now NordeaBank). 
 
Volume: SEK51 billion. 
   
UK Sunrise: 2010  
Name: UK Asset Resolution 
UK Asset Resolution, a state-owned limited company was established to 
manage the assets of the two bankrupt nationalized mortgage lenders 
Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock (Asset Management) 
 
Volume: GBP77 billion.   
   
Malaysia Sunrise: 1998 
Name: Danaharta 
Pengurusan Danaharta is Malaysia’s bad bank to alleviate the effects of 
the Asian crisis of late 1990s. Danaharta helped to rid financial 
institutions of troubled assets and maximized the recovery value of their 
NPLs. About 3000 NPLs were dealt with and Danaharta reportedly had a 
58% “final lifetime Loan Recovery Rate” surpassing the 20-50% range 
achieved by other similar sister Asian bad banks in the same perios. 
 
Volume: US$13billion. 
   
Korea Sunrise: 1997 
Name: KAMCO 
Korea Asset Management Company is a perpetual restructuring agency 
first established as a NPL management fund in April 1962, reestablished 
for the same purpose in November 1997 and converted to a bad bank in 
April 1999. It helped Korea address its NPL portfolio amounting to 
around27% of GDP as of March 1998. KAMCO successfully reduced NPLs 
to total loans ratio from 17% in March 1998 to 2.3% by end of 2002. 
 
Volume: KRW110trillion. 
   
   
   
Source: Author’s Research Work (2014) 
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2.5 Major success factors for Asset Management Companies 
 
According to Schäfer and Zimmermann (2009:9), Fung et al., (2004:14) and Ingves et al., (2004:13), the 
following factors are prerequisites for the successful operation of an AMC. 
 
Sound governance:  To succeed, the AMC should have sound corporate governance, proper internal 
control systems and effective external supervision. It must also be subjected to regular independent 
audit. For AMCON, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) have been engaged as auditors and AMCON’s 
financial statements have, to date, been audited by them (AMCON Annual Accounts, 2012:4) 
 
Clear AMC mandate: It is important that the AMC has clear objectives regarding its operation. For 
example, there must be clear objectives regarding the type of assets that will be eligible for 
acquisition, and the resolution methods. AMCON’s primary purpose which is to stimulate the recovery 
of the Nigerian financial system is clearly stated and backed by its enabling laws. 
 
Sound and effective legal infrastructure: A supportive and effective legal system, which grants special 
legal powers that include bankruptcy and foreclosure laws to the AMC, helps the AMC to execute its 
mandate and to achieve a higher recovery rate more rapidly. AMCON was established by an enabling 
Act, the AMCON Act 2010 which was signed into law on July 19, 2010.   
 
Strong political will: It is important that an AMC should operate with strong political backing, 
sufficient independence, and freedom from political pressure. AMCON thus has the full backing and 
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guarantee of the Federal Government of Nigeria and remain independent of any political pressure. 
AMCON is led by a Board which includes the Managing Director of AMCON and representatives from 
the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF), the Central Bank of Nigeria, (CBN), the Stock Exchange 
Commission, and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). All members of the AMCON 
Board are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, subject however to 
confirmation by the Senate.  
Explicit government financial support:  It is highly preferable that government should finance an 
AMC’s operations directly. Whenever an AMC has to issue its own debt instead, it should have an 
explicit guarantee by the government in order to strengthen the financial position of the AMC. 
AMCON’s initial funding was provided in the AMCON Act – N 10 billion contributed evenly by the 
Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) and Central Bank of Nigeria (AMCON, 2013:10). Also, the AMCON bonds 
are guaranteed in full by the Federal Government of Nigeria and bear the full faith and credit of the 
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) in accordance with the provisions of Section 26(I) and 27 of the 
AMCON Act, 2010 and Section 47 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007. 
 
Functional capital market: A well-functioning and efficient capital market is needed to facilitate 
speedy asset disposition by the AMC. In addition, the market should encourage foreign investors to 
purchase assets from the AMC especially in a less developed domestic capital market. AMCON bonds 
may be traded on the Nigeria Stock Exchange and / or Over-The-Counter in the same manner as FGN, Sub-
national and bonds utilizing the CBN or Nigeria inter-bank settlements System for settlement arrangements 
AMCON (2013:35). 
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Well-defined AMC tenure: In general, the AMC should have a limited tenure to prevent it from not 
taking too long to sell off assets due to the fear of large losses. The tenure should be sufficient to give 
the AMC the time needed to deal with the assets effectively. Note that the AMCON Act 2010 clearly 
envisaged that AMCON’s tenure would be terminated by 2020 thus complying with this prerequisite. 
 
Transparency: The AMC should disclose its audited results periodically, reflecting its operational 
performance in a manner that is easily understood by the public. AMCON has published its annual 
financial reports for the years 2011 and 2012 and this reporting is expected to continue through its 
operational tenure. 
 
Realistic pricing:  It is generally good practice that assets be transferred to the AMC at market prices. 
However, incentives such as a profit-loss-sharing agreement can help to facilitate asset transfers. 
 
Speedy resolution:  The AMC should aim for speedy disposition of acquired assets. Delays due to the 
need for economic turnaround in order to increase recovery can result in slower resolution and larger 
losses. 
 
2.5.1 Summary of AMCON compliance  
This section presents a summary of how the structure of AMCON and the characteristic and pricing of 
its bonds comply with the key prerequisites for a successful AMC (AMCON 2013:35).   
 
LIQUIDITY STATUS - The Bonds qualify as instruments in which: 
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− the CBN may invest under the CN Act 2007,   
− pension funds may invest under the Pension Reform Act 2004, and  
− liquid assets for banks for the purposes of computing liquidity ratios. 
 
GUARANTEE - The Bonds issued are guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Nigeria pursuant to 
Sections 26(1) and 27 of the AMCON Act.  
 
TRADING & SETTLEMENT - The Bonds maybe traded on the NSE and / or Over The Counter in the 
same manner as FGN, Sub-national and bonds utilizing the CBN or Nigeria inter-bank 
settlements System for settlement arrangements. 
 
CANCELLATION - All Bonds issued in certificate form which are redeemed will be surrendered to the 
registrar for cancellation. All Bonds cancelled will be forwarded to the Issuer and the 
obligations of the Issuer in respect of any such Bonds shall be discharged 
 
EARLY REDEMPTION - The Issuer may, with written notice, redeem the Bonds in part or in whole 
subject to the Shelf Prospectus 
 
TAXATION - The Bonds are exempt from taxation in Nigeria.  
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2.6 Institutional AMC “bad bank” models  
There are two main institutional models of AMCs.  
1. Centralized or government funded.  
2. Decentralized or privately funded.   
 
2.6.1 Centralized AMCs  
Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:3) described a public or centralized AMC as an institution established 
and owned by the government of a country with the objective of acquiring, managing, and disposing 
of distressed assets. Examples of this type of AMC include the Korea Asset Management Corporation, 
the Malaysian Danaharta, the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in Ireland, the La Sociedad 
de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB) in Spain and the Asset 
Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON).  
Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:4) argue that when the bad loan problem is at a systemic level 
and this is coupled with a weak legal system for debt resolution, then a centralized AMC is usually the 
most effective.  Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:6) noted further that systemic banking problems 
are characterized by a huge amount of NPLs which makes it imperative that these countries choose a 
centralized model over a bank-based model. According to Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004), in  
the case of Thailand, the ratio of NPLs to total loans was at its highest level of 43% in 1998 and 39% in 
1999: several commercial and hundreds of merchant banks became bankrupt. In the case of 
Indonesia, government was forced to nationalize a large amount of its financial system over three  to 
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four years. In both countries it was evident that for the banking system to survive, strong government 
intervention was called for. 
Elliott (2009:6) noted that in the early 1990s, Sweden adopted a centralized bad bank approach to 
restructure the toxic assets of two of its major local banks.   
Furthermore, Ingves et al. (2004:10) assert that centralized AMCs are effective in removing NPLs from 
troubled banks.  
2.6.2 Decentralized AMCs and Work-out Units 
Decentralized AMCs may be government-owned or privately-owned. Among the private AMCs, some 
are independent entities while others are subsidiaries of banks, or work-out units or departments 
within the bank. Although the decentralized AMCs share certain similarities, especially when designed 
to address bad assets from specific banks, public decentralized AMCs differ from bad banks and also 
differ from restructuring units created and controlled by individual private banks to restructure their 
own private bank.  
Two key differences as suggested by Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:5) include: 
(i) the assumption of risk and gain, and 
(ii) accountability. 
In terms of risk and gains for the private decentralized AMCs, Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:5) stated 
that these are held by the parent companies. They added that publicly-owned AMCs assume the risks 
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associated with the disposal of the assets they hold and are accountable to the government or its 
agency, usually the Ministry of Finance but sometimes another government agency. 
 
In terms of accountability, Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:5) argued that privately-owned AMCs may 
have separate management but are accountable to the board of directors except where the bad 
banks are legally separated from the parent; for example in the case of Citibank, where a legally 
separate and independent entity within Citigroup was set up with its assets protected by the US 
Treasury (Aggarwal, Aritomo, Brenna, Clark, et al (2012:21). Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:5) cited 
the example of the bad bank created by Germany’s Hypo Vereinsbank as a separate division within 
the bank but still accountable to the Risk Management Group.  
 
Sometimes governments play a part in supporting the private bad bank by implementing asset 
guarantees in an attempt to reassure depositors. Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:5) made reference to 
the Citibank example as a classic case where government guaranteed a portion of the private bad 
bank’s assets. Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013) noted that it is possible for the government to assume 
the bad bank’s risks without sharing in its gains.  
 
According to Martini, Stegemann, Windhagen and Heuser et al. (2009:8), there are four basic 
structures for creating an individual bad bank or work-out unit. These are determined by the legal 
structure, which can be either a structured solution or a banking entity, and the degree of balance-
sheet consolidation, which can take place on- or off-balance sheet. While internal structures are 
31 
 
simpler to set up, they lack clear legal separation in terms of a clean balance separation and de-
consolidation of risks.  
2.6.2.1 On-balance sheet guarantee:  This is a guarantee by the government that helps to protect the 
bank’s portfolio against losses. Martini, Stegemann, Windhagen and Heuser et al. (2009:8) state that 
this solution typically comes with a second loss guarantee which often serves as the first step towards 
stabilizing a bank as it allows banks to buy more time until they can develop a more comprehensive 
strategy. This was the case with Citibank and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). 
2.6.2.2 Internal Restructuring Unit: This structure is likely to be deployed by a private bank when its 
portfolio of bad and non-strategic assets constitutes a significant proportion (20% or more) of its 
balance sheet. Martini et al.  (2009:8) argue, however, that this on-balance sheet solution may lack 
efficient risk transfer, but its benefits come in form of a clear signal to the market and increased 
transparency. 
2.6.2.3 Off-balance sheet SPV: An off-balance sheet solution helps the affected institution to transfer its 
toxic portfolio off its balance sheet into a government-sponsored special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
Martini et al. (2009:8-9) explained that this structured solution is better suited to small and 
homogeneous sets of assets. However, bank assets are now usually heterogeneous and highly 
complex, and in view of this, Martini et al. argue that it is now unfeasible to adopt this strategy.   
2.6.2.4 Bad bank spin-off: This solution ensures maximum risk transfer and improves the “core” bank’s 
strategic flexibility. This is the most attractive option to bank investors. According to Martini et al. 
(2009:9) this involves disposing the distressed assets into a legally separate or external bad bank and 
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is the most effective solution. Martini et al stated that the bad bank spin-off is often a last resort 
mechanism because of (a) complexities surrounding asset valuation and transfer, (b) funding not 
being readily available, and (c) lack of common legal or accounting systems for asset separation.  
 
2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of AMCs 
Several benefits of AMCs have been discussed by researchers and practitioners and there appears to 
be reasonable support for the view that AMCs are very effective in systemic bank restructuring.  
Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:3) established that AMCs can help to halt the debt overhang in 
the financial system by removing a large amount of the toxic assets from the books of affected banks 
and thereby freeing up tied capital. These writers report that banks are given a fresh start by “turning 
a new leaf” more rapidly and they can focus on financial intermediation, which is their core business, 
since the AMCs take over the restructuring and management of the bad loans in the banking system.   
Furthermore, Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:3)  added that the acquisition of bad loans by the 
AMC can open up the market for NPLs. 
Aggarwal et al. (2012:3) write that the main principle of the bad bank model is to help a financial 
institution under stress to rebuild trust by clearly segregating weak assets from the rest. According to 
Aggarwal et al. (2012:3), the separation of the “bad bank” and the “good bank” helps ensure 
transparency of the core bank’s performance and accelerates the deleveraging process and facilitates 
quicker restructuring of its balance sheet. Pinedo (2009:2) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009:9) 
affirmed that when banks are free of toxic assets, confidence of the private investor and market can 
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be quickly re-established, allowing the “good” bank easier access to cheaper capital and resumption 
of normal lending activities.  
However, bad banks do have certain drawbacks. First, very large amounts of capital are needed to 
create a bad bank, therefore funding of the bad bank has been a major concern for regulators. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009:9)  stated that the issue that often discourages the establishment and 
implementation of a state-owned bad bank is the scope of troubled assets, invariably requiring an 
initial capital requirement which often represents a tangible proportion of GDP. The challenge for 
such a situation is that if a centralized (i.e. sovereign) bad bank is not practicable, then it is highly 
likely that the available policy options may be ineffective to achieve the required success.  Second, the 
bad bank solution could crystallize losses for the core bank rendering it undercapitalized or insolvent 
(Elliott, 2009:7). Third, additional costs in the form of moral hazard may result if the conditions for the 
purchase of toxic assets represent an incentive for banks to rely on government bailouts in the future. 
Further, valuation of the securities is a major challenge. Fourth, Pinedo (2009:4) highlighted that for 
illiquid markets, there is a challenge for banking institutions’ interpretations of mark-to-market 
accounting for assets. The application of mark-to-market accounting has resulted in the 
announcement of new write-downs each quarter. These write-down announcements sap investor 
confidence in financial institutions and lead to stock price declines and increased volatility. 
Uncertainty regarding future losses and whether and when market and asset values will hit “bottom” 
inhibit private investment in financial institutions. Fifth, Elliott (2009:7) writes that generally, 
portfolios of bad assets are complex securities whose economic values change in accordance with 
changing conditions in the housing and credit markets. 
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2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
The main aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of “bad banks” and there is evidence to 
show that AMC vehicles, regardless of their structure, are beneficial for removing NPLs from troubled 
banks and they permit management to focus on the good bank. To support this finding, in Chapters 4 
and 5, we will look at AMCON’s restructuring efforts in Nigeria with a view to determining if the “bad 
bank” solution has helped to rebuild confidence in banks’ balance sheets and the capital markets, 
facilitated access to refinancing opportunities for borrowers, and prevented job losses in the banking 
industry.  
 
In concluding this chapter, the advantages and disadvantages of the major AMC types are presented 
in Table 2.1 as seen below. 
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Table 2.1: Advantages and Disadvantages of AMCs 
AMC Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Centralized 
 
Serves as a vehicle for getting NPLs out of troubled banks, based on 
uniform valuation criteria. 
Removal of bad assets from balance sheet. 
Centralizes scarce human resources (domestic and foreign). 
Centralizes ownership of collateral, thus providing more leverage over 
debtors and more effective management. 
Can be given special legal powers to expedite loan recovery and bank 
restructuring. 
No further involvement with assets, which are removed from balance 
sheet and managed by government AMC. 
Government will establish legal entity and structure transaction. 
Government more likely to accept broader scope of troubled asset 
classes. 
Management is often weaker than in private structures, reducing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. 
Such agencies are often subject to political pressure. 
Values of acquired assets erode faster when they are outside a 
banking structure. 
NPLs and collateral are often long-term “parked” in an AMC, not 
liquidated. 
If not actively managed, existence of public AMC could lead to a 
general deterioration of credit discipline in financial system. 
Cost involved in operating an AMC may be higher than a private 
arrangement. 
If dealing with private banks, determining transfer prices is 
difficult. 
Private (& Bank Specific 
“separate bad bank”) 
 
Institution can structure an ideal solution tailored to a specific 
portfolio of troubled assets.  
Bad bank will not face conflicts of interest with troubled asset 
counterparties and will have time to manage assets.  
Depending on structure, shareholders may receive interest in bad 
bank, retaining some potential upside. 
Permits management focus on good bank.  
Separate good bank improves rating agency, shareholder, investor 
and market perception of institution.  
Private structure will not subject institution to executive 
compensation and corporate governance requirements.  
Specialized skill mix.  
Up-front loss recognition. Cleans up the bank’s books. 
Lack of knowledge of the borrower. 
Bank may not have sufficient capital to recognize up-front losses 
associated with selling to an AMC. 
Valuation of assets challenging and highly negotiated; likely to 
result in either short-term additional write-downs or longer-term 
opportunity costs 
May require ongoing management of assets, for example on a 
contract basis, depending on investors.  
Establishment of new legal entity may raise regulatory compliance 
and charter issues 
“Within Bank”  
 
Knowledge of the borrower may facilitate debt restructuring. 
Access to borrower through branch network. 
Ease of transaction execution — no need to establish separate legal 
entity; valuation questions simpler. 
Does not eliminate future option of bad bank. 
No upfront funding requirement for any guarantor. 
Guarantee and assets can be restructured. 
Retention of upside 
Long-term nature of guarantee results in longer-term imposition of 
government rules.  
Asset management decisions subject to government rules. 
Assets retained on balance sheet: additional losses to be absorbed; 
management costs; ongoing management distraction. 
Does not achieve public separation from bad assets, no good bank 
boost 
Does not provide funding, bank must continue to finance the 
assets 
Source: Author’s Research Work (2014), Pinedo (2009:16-18) and Gandrud and Hallerberg (2013:12) adapted 
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3. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
3.1 Case study 
This study attempts to provide a balanced assessment of the Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (AMCON), and its role in resolving non-performing loans in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis. AMCON is Nigeria’s bad bank and is the first of this kind in Africa. It is still fully-operational, 
having reached its third full year of operations. For these reasons, coupled with the fact that there is 
no broad sample as this is an isolated instance, the case study design is therefore adopted for this 
study. 
 
This case study design is preferred “when the investigator has little control over events; ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being posed; and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life 
context.” (Yin, 2009:2). The primary advantage of a case study is that it provides much more detailed 
information than what is available through other methods, such as surveys. Case studies also allow a 
researcher to present data collected from multiple methods (such as surveys, interviews, document 
review, and observation) to provide the complete story.  
 
For the purposes of this study, evidence from different sources ranging from economic indicators to 
media reports and newspaper interviews are considered. The indicators used for assessing AMCON’s 
effectiveness are the following:  asset quality, bank capital, GDP growth, capital market index, capital 
flows, bank credit, banking sector liquidity, and AMCON’s operational profitability.  
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The data used in this study were drawn from Bloomberg, Trading Economics, AMCON’s annual 
financial reports and Central Bank of Nigeria statistics covering a five-year period from the beginning 
of the financial crisis; that is, from 2008 to 2013. However, the analysis of AMCON’s operational 
profitability covers its first two years of operation; that is, from 2011 to 2012. This study could not 
extend into the 2013 financial year as AMCON’s audited financials had not been released by the time 
this study was performed. 
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4. THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT 
4.1 Introduction 
Any case study takes place within a specific context and the results of a case study should never be 
considered independently from that context. As stated in the preceding chapter, the indicators used 
in this study for assessing AMCON’s effectiveness are asset quality measured in terms of NPL ratio, 
bank capital, GDP growth, capital market index, capital flows, bank credit, banking sector liquidity, and 
AMCON’s operational profitability.  
 
According to European Investment Bank (EIB), Nigeria’s banking system suffered a high level of toxic 
NPL since the banking crisis of 2008 and in 2009 alone, the banking sector’s aggregate loan book 
quality, as measured by the ratio of NPL to total loans stood at 34.6%. Between 2004 and 2010, the 
ratio averaged 16.7%. (European Investment Bank, 2013:62). Furthermore, the local economy faltered 
from the second-round effect of the crisis as Nigeria’s stock market collapsed by 70 % in 2008-2009 
with many Nigerian banks sustaining huge losses (CBN, 2012:2). According to CBN (2012:2), Nigerian 
GDP growth was also running below its 5-year average. This scenario underscored the continuing 
costs and toll of the global crisis on Nigeria. It was also evidence of the repercussions of the unfolding 
crisis of liquidity, confidence and solvency in the financial system. 
In 2010, the National Assembly established the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (or 
“AMCON”), a special purpose vehicle (bad bank), with the aim of addressing the problem of non-
performing loans in the Nigerian banking industry, among others.  
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4.2 The Nigerian Financial System 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is technically an independent regulator, but in practice it works 
closely with the Federal Ministry of Finance and helps to develop and implement macroeconomic 
policies. The deposit taking institutions are referred to in Nigeria as deposit money banks (DMBs) and 
include local banks and branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks. However, the level of foreign 
ownership is not very high in Nigeria, in contrast to other developing or emerging markets. Currently, 
foreign-owned banks are limited to Standard Chartered Bank of Nigeria, Citigroup (Nigeria 
International Bank), Stanbic IBTC (a member of the Standard Bank of South Africa) and Ecobank 
Nigeria, a subsidiary of Ecobank Transnational Incorporated of Togo. 
The regulatory and supervisory institutions consist of the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF), the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Insurance 
Commission (NAICOM), the National Pension Commission (PENCOM), and the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (Ecobank, 2013:2).  
 
Figure 4.1 below depicts the organogram of the Nigerian financial system. 
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Figure 4.1: The Nigerian Financial System Structure 
 
Source: Ecobank (2013) 
 
4.2.1 Nigerian Banking Crisis 
 
Although the global crisis, with the subsequent drop in stock market indices throughout the world, 
might have accelerated the onset of the crisis in Nigeria, the Nigerian crisis was largely homemade. 
Historically, the Nigerian financial system has been characterized by significant transformations: 
notably the banking system consolidation of 2005-2006 to address the problem of weak capital base 
in banks by stipulating a minimum capital base of N25billion (US$156million) and the banking crisis of 
2009 which happened to coincide with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Particularly, (European 
International Bank, [EIB], 2013:59) noted that the banking sectors in the other sub-Saharan African 
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countries remained quite resilient during the period: a situation that placed the Nigerian banking 
sector in isolation in the region. 
According to AMCON (2013:7), Nigerian banks raised over N1.6trillion between 2006 and 2008; 
banking sector assets as a percentage of GDP increased rapidly to over 60% in 2008. Subsequently, 
this ratio surged even more to 112% with most of the credit originations and subsequent disbursals in 
the system coming from margin traders who took positions in Nigeria’s equity market and from oil 
importers who took unhedged positions. When the global financial crisis ripples started spreading, 
Nigeria’s banking sector could not withstand the shocks and consequently most of the credit 
exposures became “toxic.” The damage being caused in the sector prompted the CBN to clamp down 
on lending malpractices before initiating another round of consolidation (Ecobank, 2013:1). 
Other factors contributing to the Nigerian crisis identified by the authorities include:1  
i. Critical gaps in regulatory framework and regulations. 
ii. Macro-economic instability caused by large and sudden capital inflows. 
iii. Lack of investor and consumer sophistication. 
iv. Inadequate disclosure and transparency about the financial position of banks. 
v. Unstructured governance and weak management processes within the CBN. 
vi. Uneven supervision and enforcement, and weaknesses in the overall business environment. 
 
______________________________ 
1 Also see IMF Country Report No. 13/146, 2013. Available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13146.pdf 
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4.2.2 Remedial Measures to Mitigate the Impact on the Banking Sector 
The CBN intervened again in 2009 by conducting a sector-wide stress test, in a joint exercise with the 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘NDIC’). This showed that nine out of the 23 Nigerian banks 
were technically insolvent and required immediate intervention. According to the CBN, these stress 
tests highlighted grave issues bordering on capital adequacy and liquidity requirements in banks. The 
tests also reflected significant weaknesses in financial risk management, corporate governance 
failures, severe political instability, virulent inflation, worsening economic financial conditions of their 
corporate borrowers and increasing incidence of fraud and embezzlement of funds, and the use of 
hedge funds.2 
This diagnosis led to the introduction of several measures by the CBN between 2008 and 2009. These 
measures included the following stages, but not necessarily in sequential order: 
 
Phase 1: Changes in Policy Rates.  The following key measures were changed: 
(a) Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) 
(b) Cash reserve ratio (CRR)  
(c) Liquidity Ratio (LR)  
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
2 
See http://www.cenbank.org/out/2011/pressrelease/gvd/press%20statement%20-%20gov.pdf 
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The MPR was gradually reduced to 6% from 10.25% between September 18, 2008 and July 7, 2009 
and was subsequently raised to 6.25% on September 21, 2010. The CRR was similarly reduced to 2% 
from 4% and then further to 1%. However, the liquidity ratio (LR) was progressively reduced to 25% 
from 40% during the same period of time.  
 
Phase 2: Enforcement of CBN Code of Corporate Governance and Directive to banks to restructure 
their loan books. First, the CBN placed much greater emphasis on the enforcement of its Code of 
Corporate Governance in order to promote transparency and accountability in banks. The CBN also 
held a review of its contingency plan for dealing with systemic distress in banks.  
 
Second, the CBN issued a directive to banks to restructure their margin loans up to 2009, and 
expanded its discount window to allow for additional instruments as well as to allow banks to borrow 
up to 360 days in addition to stoppage of liquidity mopping-up. It was discovered that nine banks 
were the main users of the Expanded Discount Window (EDW) over a nine-month period ending June 
2009. According to Ecobank (2013:3), the CBN injected approximately $4.2bn into the banks. In July 
2009, the CBN closed the EDW. 
 
Phase 3: Interbank Placement Guarantee Arrangement by the CBN. After the EDW was suspended, 
the CBN chose, in place of the EDW, to guarantee interbank placements. Once again, the CBN 
observed that the same set of nine banks were the major net-takers under the guarantee 
arrangement.  
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These measures did not fully resolve the problems in the system as it remained fragile.  
 
At this point it was clear that the issue was far beyond being just a liquidity problem and if drastic 
actions were not taken, the financial system could collapse. Poor risk management practices were 
prevalent, in the form of a lack of necessary control measures; thus, the board and management of 
the banks had failed to observe established controls. CBN thereafter replaced the senior management 
and executive directors of the affected banks. 
 
Phase 4: Establishment of AMCON (bad bank).  Following the failure of the various measures in 
addressing the banking crisis in Nigeria, CBN, the monetary authority, set up the Asset Management 
Company of Nigeria (AMCON) backed by the AMCON Act 2010 signed into law on July 19, 2010, to 
swap all the non-performing loans for tradable zero-coupon Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) 
bonds. According to Ecobank (2013:3), AMCON made its first bonds issuance in 2010, which was 
worth US$5.4bn. By the third quarter of 2012, the value of AMCON bonds had climbed to US$11bn.  
 
According to CBN (2011:1), the same nine banks were found to be in a grave situation as a result of 
capital, liquidity and corporate governance concerns. Apart from accumulating high levels of non-
performing loans, these banks were seriously exposed to the oil and gas sector as well as to the 
capital markets. They failed to meet the minimum 10 % capital adequacy ratio and 25 % minimum 
liquidity ratio. They also accounted for additional losses estimated at over N1.44trillion (US$9 billion). 
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The remaining fourteen banks were found to be in a sound financial state and did not require the CBN 
to take any action. 
 
Other measures also taken by the CBN included developing a macro-prudential framework to address 
issues such as poor corporate governance, weak risk management practices, poor reporting and lack 
of enforcement. The CBN also introduced risk-based supervision, reforms in regulations and 
regulatory framework, and consumer literacy and protection. Furthermore, the universal banking 
model being practiced after its introduction in 2001 was replaced with a bank holding model under 
which banks are not allowed to invest in non-bank subsidiaries. The banking industry was also 
segmented into international, national, regional, specialized and monoline banks with varying capital 
requirements. Already the guidelines for specialized institutions have been fixed as follows: non-
interest bank (regional) - N5 billion (US$31.25million); noninterest bank (National) - N10 billion 
(US$62.5million); and primary mortgage institutions - N5 billion (US$31.25million);. The commercial 
banks have also been restructured into regional, national, and international banks with paid-up share 
capital of N10 billion (US$62.5million), N25 billion (US$156.25million), and N50 billion 
(US$312.5million), respectively. 
 
The Nigerian experience underlines that rapid changes in market structure have to be carefully 
monitored and accompanied by the necessary regulatory and supervisory upgrades, as well as proper 
corporate governance structures.  
46 
 
4.3 Rationale for a Public “Bad Bank” in Nigeria  
The Nigerian financial system is dominated by the banking sector, which represents about 90% of the 
assets of the financial system Soludo (2009:4). Soludo (2009) stated further that the banking system 
accounts for about 65% of the market capitalization of the Nigerian Stock Exchange and that it is the 
key driver of the economy.  Soludo (2009) opined further that new credit to the private sector is 
expected to exceed the combined spending by the three tiers of government (this was the case in 
2008 and never happened in Nigeria before). According to former CBN Governor, Professor Charles 
Soludo, “Nigeria cannot afford a banking crisis: the non-deficit part of the FGN budget in 2009 is less 
than banks’ capital; hence the totality of FGN budget cannot recapitalize the banks if the system 
should collapse. With the drying up of global finance, and non-bank investing public still nascent, the 
scope for funding any bank bailout in Nigeria is slim - except by ‘printing  money’.”3 
According to AMCON (2013:11), a failure to resolve the banking crisis would have led to the following: 
 Continued shutdown of credit markets, and increased job losses. 
 A negative impact on Nigeria’s credit rating and risk rating, as a result of banks’ negative 
shareholders’ funds. 
 A negative impact on the real sector. The Intervened Banks had N4.4 trillion (US$27.5billion) in 
deposits and Interbank takings, including over N2 trillion (US$12.5billion) of Public Sector 
funds. They also had between eight and ten million customers and 50,000 staff. 
 
______________________________ 
3 
Prof. Chukwuma C. Soludo, ex-Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria, “Banking in Nigeria at a time of global financial crisis”, A Presentation 
at the Special Interactive Session on the Banking System, 30th March, 2009 
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 Contagion impact on other banks:  with total banking deposits of N10.9 trillion 
(US$62.5billion). 
 Without an AMC, the only option available to the Government would have been to liquidate 
the Banks through the NDIC.  
 As evident from the recently announced NDIC statement, settlement of depositors of failed 
banks would be at 3 kobo per Naira. Naira is Nigeria’s official legal tender and there are 100 
kobo in a naira so this represents a 3% return or 97% haircut.  
 Diminished confidence shown by foreign creditors and investors 
Therefore, the rationale for the establishment of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria 
(AMCON) was timely.  
 
4.4 Asset Management Company of Nigeria (AMCON) 
AMCON is a multipurpose resolution vehicle, which is empowered to purchase non-performing assets 
from banks, inject needed capital through the issuance of bonds, as well as engender mergers and 
acquisitions and capital injection by new investors (EIB, 2013:62).  AMCON was established to buy the 
non-performing loans (NPLs) and provide capital for the rescued banks.  
4.4.1 AMCON’s role in the Bank Restructuring Process 
The establishment of AMCON was part of a crisis resolution strategy for the broad banking sector and 
was central to the healthy evolution of the overall financial sector.  
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The AMCON Act 2010 was signed into law on July 19, 2010. The intention was that when operational, 
AMCON would serve as a vehicle to free the banks from the weight of their non-performing assets 
and would accelerate the process of financial revitalization of the banking sector. 
The Banking Supervision Annual Report (2008:65-66) indicated that non-performing credits were 
approximately 21.6 %, 18.12 %, 8.77 % and 8.44 % in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. 
According to Ecobank Research (2013:7), this ratio of nonperformance was 6.3 %, 27.6 % and 15.7 % 
in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. Provision for bad and doubtful debts grew from N200 billion in 
2004 to N400 billion in 2008. Ecobank (2013:7) stated that according to accepted international 
standards, the maximum acceptable higher limit for the ratio of risky assets (loans and advances) to 
deposit liabilities is 75% for efficiently run banks.  
 
The main purpose of AMCON is to stimulate the recovery of the Nigerian financial system through the 
following four activities: providing liquidity to the Intervened Banks and the non-Intervened Banks; 
providing capital to the Intervened Banks and the non-Intervened Banks; increasing confidence in 
bank balance sheets; and, increasing access to restructuring/refinancing opportunities for borrowers. 
The functions of AMCON are described in Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2: Functions of AMCON 
 
Source: AMCON (2013) 
 
AMCON released a presentation document in 2013 (http://www.amcon.com.ng/documents) which 
reports that it has to date acquired more than 12,500 Banking sector NPLs worth N1.845 trillion 
(US$11.5 billion). The document then reports that by end of 2011, it had already successfully 
restructured N600billion (US$3.75billion) of the NPLs acquired.  
In December 2010, AMCON started by paying N866.2 billion to purchase Eligible Bank Assets (EBAs) 
from Eligible Financial Institutions (EFIs). 
 In April 2011, AMCON commenced registration for its Debt Issuance Programme and made 
further purchases of additional EBAs at a purchase price of N377.8 billion. 
 In August 2011 AMCON capitalized and acquired three Bridge Banks: Mainstreet Bank, 
Enterprise Bank and Keystone Bank (referred to as the “AMCON 3”). These were acquired from 
the NDIC for a total of N765.3billion (c. US$4.91billion) and prevented a potential liquidation. 
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 Funds injected into the eligible banks through bond issuances have brought each respective 
bank’s capital back to the minimum capital requirement of N25billion (c. US$160million) and 
to the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10% as stipulated by the CBN. 
 AMCON appointed financial advisers to provide advisory services towards determining 
strategic exit options for AMCON’s shareholdings in the Bridge Banks. 
 Between September and October 2011, AMCON provided Deposit Restoration Funds to 
Equatorial Trust Bank, FinBank, Oceanic Bank, Intercontinental Bank and Union Bank through 
bond issuances of N1.566trillion (US$10.06billion). This was done to prevent failure of these 
Intervened banks. All of these banks have been successfully capitalized, with some now 
merged and others under new management. 
 In December 2011, AMCON acquired strategically important EBAs at a purchase price of 
N748.3 billion. 
 In December 2012, AMCON acquired additional EBAs at a purchase price of N75.9 billion. 
 
 
4.4.2 Status of AMCON’s Acquired Assets  
AMCON recently stated that by October 2013, it had restructured almost 50% of its acquired loans, of 
which 54% were performing. In the case of the non-performing portion, AMCON acquired the right to 
call upon the collateral. However, AMCON’s preference is to get loans to perform and there is reason 
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to believe that this could be facilitated by the refinancing arrangement with CBN. Its target is to have 
restructured 60% of its purchased loans by 2013 year-end. 
 
4.4.3 AMCON’S Governance Structure 
AMCON can be described as a centralized publicly-owned asset management company (Ingves et al., 
2004:8). It was established in July 2010. AMCON’s primary purpose is to resolve, efficiently, the 
problems associated with the non-performing loan assets of Nigerian banks. 
 
4.4.3.1 CBN Oversight 
The CBN is responsible for supervising and regulating the activities and functions of AMCON. In 
carrying out its supervisory role, the CBN may appoint independent examiners to carry out special or 
routine examinations of the books of AMCON. The CBN may also make regulations to give effect to 
the provisions of the AMC as and when necessary. 
4.4.3.2 Appointment of AMCON Board 
AMCON is governed by a Board of directors. AMCON’s Board and Senior Management Team were 
appointed in the third quarter of 2010. The Board consists of ten members: four executive directors 
and six non-executive directors. The Board includes the Managing Director of AMCON and 
representatives from the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF), the Central Bank of Nigeria, (CBN), the 
Stock Exchange Commission, and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC).  
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All members of the AMCON Board are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
subject however to confirmation by the Senate.  
The composition of the Board is as follows:  
I. The Chairman, who is nominated by the Ministry of Finance in consultation with the Minister. 
II. The Managing Director, who is nominated by the CBN. 
III. Three Executive Directors who are nominated by the CBN in consultation with the Minister of 
Finance.  
IV. Five Non-Executive Directors, two of whom are nominated by the Ministry of Finance, two by 
the CBN and one by the NDIC. 
 
 The oversight functions of the Board are performed through its various Committees: 
I. Board Audit Risk and Compliance Committee. 
II. Board Credit and Asset Management Committee. 
III. Board Compensation and Performance Committee. 
 
4.4.4 Financing of AMCON 
AMCON’s initial funding was provided through the AMCON Act; in terms of that Act, a total of N10 
billion was contributed in equal amounts by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and CBN (AMCON, 
2013:10). 
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AMCON uses funds from three main sources to purchase NPLs from the Nigerian banks and to fund its 
operations: 
(1) Equity of N10 billion provided by the Federal Government and the CBN  (0.22%). 
(2) Zero-coupon bonds valued at N4.04 trillion issued by AMCON  (88.80%), and  
(3) debentures issued by CBN; total value of N500 billion  (10.98%). 
 
The CBN and Nigerian banks agreed to set up the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Trust Fund. They 
agreed that for each year, until AMCON has repaid all outstanding obligations, Nigerian banks will 
contribute 0.50% of their total assets to the Banking Sector Resolution Cost Trust Fund while the CBN 
will contribute N50 billion per annum for 10 years. The Fund is managed independent of AMCON, with 
a Board of Trustees to manage and protect the funds. It is anticipated that the contributions will 
continue for about ten years, but no more than fifteen years (AMCON 2013:18). AMCON stated that 
the fund will be utilized to make up any shortfall between funds generated from AMCON’s operations 
and the value of bonds to be redeemed or serviced. The Fund is managed independent of AMCON, 
with a Board of Trustees to manage and protect the funds. It is thus not held by AMCON and there is 
no mention of same in the reported financials. Note that these are largely AMCON debts to CBN 
which the CBN expects to recover from AMCON via proceeds from the sinking fund and recoveries 
 
According to Section 14 of AMCON FAQ, the bonds have the full guarantee of the Federal Government 
of Nigeria (FGN) and legally backed by the AMCON Act, 2010 and also by the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
20074.  
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Section 13 of the AMCON FAQ, states that…  
...“AMCON will redeem bonds through funds obtained from its operations; these funds will include capital gains, 
divestment/ sale of assets, asset returns, recoveries, sale of loans and investments in Intervened Banks. Subject to the terms 
of the applicable Pricing Supplement, each bond will be redeemed by the issuer on the maturity date at its final redemption 
amount (par value)”
 4.
  
 
Proshare, a Nigeria-based sell-side research firm, reported on its website on May 17 2013 that 
AMCON, in consultation with the CBN, initiated a comprehensive plan for refinancing its initial N5.7 
trillion zero-coupon bonds maturing from Dec 31, 2013 to Oct 2014.5 
 
Proshare (www.proshareng.com) notes AMCON’s very good progress made on recoveries and 
restructuring, and the exceptional co-operation of the Money Deposit Banks in fulfilling their 
commitments to the Financial Sector Resolution Fund – Sinking Fund.  Proshare then states that 
AMCON was able to retire about N2.0 trillion of its bonds during 2013 and 2014 and to refinance 
approximately N3.6 trillion. Proshare opines that this may help to reduce AMCON’s bond liabilities by 
about 35% which is well ahead of schedule.  
The sources of repayment will be AMCON recoveries and the sinking fund. Consequently, the CBN, 
which regulates and supervises all contributing institutions including AMCON, is well-placed to ensure 
that AMCON obtains maximum recoveries and that all banks continue to contribute as agreed. 
 
 
4 
See Page 3 of AMCON FAQ. Available at: http://www.amcon.com.ng/resources  
5 
http://www.proshareng.com/news/20008/AMCON-announces-Comprehensive-Refinancing-Plans-for-N57trillion-bonds 
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Refer to figure 4.3 for the breakdown of AMCON Bonds which AMCON intends to refinance, maturing 
from December 31, 2013 to November 2014: 
 
Figure 4.3: Breakdown of AMCON Bond Issuances 
 
Source: AMCON 
 The banks that received these bonds either 1) sold portions to the CBN to raise funds to settle their 
interbank liabilities and/or 2) kept them on their balance sheets as Held-To-Maturity assets.  
 Approximately NGN2 trillion is on the banks’ balance sheets while the balance of approximately 
NGN3.6 trillion vests with the CBN. This applies to the NPLs of N2.5 trillion naira purchased by 
AMCON with AMCON bonds issued to the banks as the purchase consideration. 
 AMCON will retire the NGN2 trillion held by the banks in years 2013 and 2014. The repayments will 
be effected by a combination of cash and “liquidity status qualifying instruments;” that is, T-bills.  
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Both AMCON and CBN have stressed that the refinancing will be in a manner consistent with efficient 
macroeconomic stability ensuring no monetary policy dislocation. That statement is taken to mean 
that the CBN will not allow cash to flood the market and threaten the naira and hence inflation. The 
author of this report believes that banks are likely to receive T-bills in exchange for most of their 
AMCON bonds.  
 The redemption of bonds held by banks is expected to be complete by October 2014 at which point 
the CBN will be sole creditor to AMCON, holding NGN3.6 trillion of bonds.  
 The CBN announced that the remaining bonds will be refinanced at the new rate of 6% (currently 
on offer up to 13%).  
 The CBN advised that the AMCON levy, whereby all banks contribute to the AMCON sinking fund, is 
unlikely to be raised further from the current level of 0.5% of each bank’s total assets in the 
previous year. As at 2012, the levy was lower at 0.3%.  
The CBN expects to recover its debt from AMCON via proceeds from the sinking fund and recoveries. 
To a large extent, this will become an internal affair between AMCON and CBN. 
 
4.4.5 The Development of a Market for Distressed Assets 
When AMCON started its operations in December 2010, it had little experience in purchasing and 
disposing of NPLs. However, AMCON has since put in place a trading and settlement framework;  thus, 
the bonds are tradable on the NSE and/ or over the counter in the same manner as FGN or Sub-
national bonds, and bonds utilizing the CBN or Nigeria inter-bank settlements system for settlement 
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arrangements. The success of this framework will help to establish AMCON as a competent and 
effective operator in the market for distressed assets. 
 
A. Purchase of Eligible Bank Assets (i.e. NPLs) 
AMCON’s purchase of NPLs is based on certain eligibility criteria. In order to create liquidity in the 
banking sector, AMCON is empowered to purchase or acquire Eligible Bank Assets (EBAs) from Eligible 
Financial Institutions (EFIs). To facilitate this process AMCON is empowered to issue bonds or other 
forms of debt instruments as consideration for the acquisition of toxic assets of banks and other 
financial institutions.  AMCON can exercise discretion in choosing the EBAs to purchase. However the 
valuation of and subsequent purchase or acquisition of the EBAs are to be determined in accordance 
with guidelines issued from time to time by the CBN.  Eligible for purchase are salable loans whose 
security rights and transfer are legally executable, as long as those loans are classified as substandard 
or below. AMCON assigned priority to the purchase of any NPLs if their removal was considered to be 
critical to the rehabilitation of the institution concerned. 
 
Following acquisition, the EBAs automatically become vested in AMCON, which is then empowered to 
exercise all the rights and obligations previously enjoyed by the EFIs in relation to those EBAs. Thus, 
AMCON can:  institute court actions to protect, perfect or enforce any existing security rights or 
obligations; realize any security interests that the EFI could exercise; call up any guarantee; and, 
exercise all powers conferred by any document that forms part of the bank asset.  
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AMCON’s consideration mechanism for the acquisition of the EBAs centres on the issuance of bonds 
and other debt securities as consideration for those acquired toxic assets. In carrying out its debt 
issuance mandate, AMCON is empowered to borrow or raise money with or without the guarantee of 
the CBN, with the effect that the issuance would be backed by the FGN pursuant to the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 2007. 
 
B. Eligible Bank Assets – EBAs 
AMCON states in its Guidelines that no EFI shall hold on its books EBAs with an aggregate book value 
exceeding five percent (5%) of the book value of its existing loan portfolio. If an EFI should at any 
point come to hold more than 5% EBAs, then it must within 30 days offer to AMCON such portion of 
its EBA holding as is necessary to bring that holding back within the specified threshold of 5%. 
These EBAs include: 
a) Collateralised or secured non-performing loans of Eligible Financial Institutions (EFIs) which are 
substandard, doubtful or lost in accordance with the AMCON Prudential Guidelines, regardless 
of whether or not they are classified as such by the relevant EFI. 
b) Unsecured non-performing loans of EFIs which are substandard, doubtful or lost in accordance 
with the Prudential Guidelines regardless of whether or not they are classified as such by the 
EFI. 
c) Loans (whether collateralised or not) owed to an EFI that is a bank whose banking license has 
been revoked by the CBN pursuant to the Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA). 
d) Assets acquired by an EFI in the course of the satisfaction of any debt owed to that EFI, 
whether or not the underlying debt obligation remains outstanding. 
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e) Any loan which poses a significant risk to an EFI.  
 
4.4.6 Special Powers of AMCON  
In addition to its clear purchasing mandate, AMCON has other special powers in certain instances. The 
AMCON Act 2010 empowers AMCON to act as, or appoint, a receiver for a debtor company whose 
assets have been charged or mortgaged as security for an EBA acquired by AMCON.  
 
In order to ensure liquidation of debts, AMCON has the power to apply to court by way of a motion 
ex-parte (without notice to the debtor) for an order vesting it with the possession of the movable or 
immovable property of the debtor. It also has the power to apply in the same manner for an order 
freezing the accounts being held in an EFI by the debtor.  
 
4.4.7 Valuation and Pricing of Eligible Bank Assets (EBAs) 
For margin loans, AMCON valued non-performing loans (NPLs) backed by shares of listed companies 
at an implied premium of approximately 60% over the 60-day average of ‘recent’ prices ending 
November 15th 2010. This applies to intervened and regular banks. NPLs backed by other perfected 
collateral would be accepted at the most current estimate of the loan value supplied by the EFI 
concerned. AMCON may elect to verify the value ascribed to the NPLs by the EFI before purchasing 
the NPLs. EFIs will be liable for wrong values ascribed to NPLs and that liability will be in the form of 
post-sale adjustment or sale reversal. The post adjustment for valuations given by the EFI will be as 
prescribed in the CBN Guidelines. Adjustments will be by demand or direct debit from accounts kept 
with CBN. 
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Some asset classes require the consent of a regulatory body for any interest in the asset to pass in 
Nigeria; these include, for example, security over a telecommunications license as this requires the 
consent of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC). Here, upon sale to an operator, the asset 
will be held as a bare trustee thus divesting the bank of beneficial interest and the legal title will be 
that of a trustee and not an owner. AMCON predicated this arrangement having received legal advice 
confirming that trust arrangements are legal and enforceable in Nigeria. In the case of syndicated 
facilities held by a group of both Intervened and non-Intervened banks and secured by security held 
by a trustee on their behalf, these facilities will be treated as secured, subject to the condition that 
AMCON is secured. Such security can be effected either by a deed of ascension or novation or by a 
deed of assignment and restatement.  
Because of the large amount of liquidity to be added to the market, there is a danger of a glut. In 
other words,  a situation where the extremely expansive stance of monetary policy triggers monetary 
growth well ahead of economic activity, giving rise to substantial excess supply. A liquidity glut is 
undesirable as it leads to mismatch between unabated desired savings and lower realized investment, 
as well as between the amounts available for finance and the flow of hard assets to absorb it. This 
might push long-term real interest rates lower. Against this background the CBN will open a repo 
window for the purpose of repurchasing the bonds as follows: 
 up to 25% of the bonds may be repurchased up to the first anniversary of the bond 
issuance; 
 a further 25% may be repurchased up to the second anniversary; and 
 the balance of 50% may be repurchased up to the third anniversary. 
61 
 
According to AMCON, this graduated arrangement, as described above, was implemented after due 
consideration of the country’s macroeconomic outlook. 
 
4.4.8 Recent Changes to AMCON Act  
AMCON is amending its laws with the main objective of legalizing the banks’ contributions to the 
sinking fund. The sinking fund contribution required from the affected banks is currently set at 0.5% of 
on-balance sheet assets and 0.5% of 33% of off-balance sheet assets.  According to Renaissance 
Capital, this sinking fund rate could be increased in the future. Other aspects of the amendments to 
the AMCON laws include:  
1) the process of asset purchases by AMCON;  
2) giving statutory backing to a proposal to allow the banks’ AMCON sinking fund contributions to 
be treated as allowable deductions for tax purposes;  
3) the introduction of a default penalty on banks that err in calculating their contributions, and  
4) defining a finite life span for the sinking fund; for example, a life of ten years starting in 2014, 
subject to extension for a further five years.  
 
 The Act initially establishing AMCON envisaged that its existence would be terminated by 2020. 
However, AMCON representatives hold the view that AMCON will continue to operate after that; 
they feel that its continued existence will help to ensure stability of the financial system. However, 
this writer feels that this continuation would be contrary to the prerequisites for a successful bad 
bank framework. 
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4.4.9 Contributions to the Resolution Cost Fund by Nigerian Banks  
In line with Section 65 of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Act, 2010 Amendment bill, 
2014, there is the need for the establishment of a sinking fund to check any banking crisis in the 
country in the future. Nigerian banks were thus mandated by the CBN to contribute to a sinking fund, 
also known as the Resolution Cost Fund. The fund was set up to assist AMCON to meet its goals and to 
ensure that government will not bear the cost of any financial crisis in the future. Each bank is 
required to contribute to the sinking fund 0.5 % of its total assets, which was increased from 0.3 % in 
2013, and 0.5 % of 33.3 % of its off-balance sheet assets. 
As reported in the Leadership Newspaper of June 2, 2014, fifteen banks have paid the sum of N119 
billion to the AMCON sinking fund for the year 2013.5 The media report stated further that for the 
year ended December 2013, AMCON’s financial statements showed the following payments: 
 Access Bank N9.18 billion. 
 Diamond Bank N7.6 billion 
 Fidelity Bank N4.4 billion  
 First Bank  N13.85 billion  
 Guaranty Trust Bank N8.1 billion  
 Skye Bank N10.35 billion  
 Stanbic IBTC N3.82 billion  
 Sterling Bank N3.11 billion  
 UBA N9.67 billion 
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 Zenith Bank N17.55 billion 
Ecobank, FCMB, Union Bank, Stanbic IBTC, Unity Bank and Wema Bank accounted for the balance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Sinking Fund: Banks Pay N119bn to AMCON. See http://leadership.ng/news/372992/sinking-fund-banks-pay-n119bn-amcon
64 
 
5. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
  
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a review of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth trends in the Nigerian 
economy after the establishment of AMCON. This is followed by a review of the capital market and 
banking sector between 2008 and 2013 and finally, the financial performance and analysis of AMCON 
is presented.  
 
5.2 Nigeria’s GDP Growth Trends 
Figure 3.1 below shows the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth trends in Nigeria after the AMCON 
solution was implemented. Information on the GDP Growth Rate in Nigeria is reported by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria.  
The GDP in Nigeria expanded by 7.72% in the fourth quarter of 2013 when compared with the 
previous quarter. The GDP growth rate in Nigeria averaged 6.80% from 2008 until 2013, reaching an 
all-time high of 8.60% in the fourth quarter of 2010 and a record low of 4.50% in the first quarter of 
2009 while the GDP growth for end-2013 was 6.90% (See www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria).  
Note that it could not be ascertained the extent to which AMCON impacted on the changes in GDP 
over this period. However, since the banking sector is a key driver of the Nigerian economy, the 
establishment of AMCON was key to ensuring improvements in the economic situation of Nigeria.  
65 
 
Figure 5.1: Nigerian GDP Growth rate 
 
5.3 Nigerian Banking Sector and Capital Market Trends 
The Nigerian banking sector showed relative soundness and improving trends as at the end of 2011. 
The regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA) increased from the 4.2% recorded at the height 
of the crisis in June 2011 up to 17.8% at end–December 2011.  In the same vein, the Tier 1 
Capital/RWA ratio improved by 13.6% to 18.1% from 15.9% over the same period (IMF, 2013:10). 
A detailed overview of these trends in the capital markets and banking sector is presented below. 
5.3.1 Capital Market Recovery  
The sharp drop in both market capitalization and the Nigerian Stock Exchange; All Share Index 
between February 2008 and April 2009 has been reversed. The improvement in the all-share index 
(ASI) might not be due to only AMCON but following the AMCON intervention, the Nigerian capital 
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market has witnessed some stability. On July 28, 2010 market capitalization (MC) stood at NGN 6.33 
trillion while the ASI was at 25,889.98. By November 15, 2010, ASI had declined marginally to 
25,301.34 while MC increased to N8.08 trillion. 
Figure 5.2: Nigerian Capital Market Trends Q4 2009 – Q1 2014 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
5.3.2 Capital Flows Trends 
After the AMCON intervention, external exposure to Nigerian banks has improved considerably. At 
the end of 2010, EXIM Bank’s exposure to Nigerian banks increased from US$403 million to US$1 
billion. The European Investment Bank increased its exposure to Nigerian banks by an additional 
US$150 million. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has also increased its exposure to 
Nigerian banks. Recently, it has announced its intention to inject US$300 million credit into two 
Nigerian banks. This consists of US$200 million in long-term funding to GTBank and US$100 million in 
convertible sub-debt and senior loans to First Bank. 
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5.3.3 Bank Credit Trends 
Credit by non-Intervened banks also rose from N127,270 million in April 2010 to N145,885 million in 
May 2010, and N218,904 million in October 2010, representing increases of 14.63 % and 50.1 %, 
respectively. Similarly, the Intervened banks’ credit increased from N18,189 million to N27,922 million 
and N43,371million, representing 53.51 % and 55.33 % increases, respectively. The bulk of the credit 
went to Oil and Gas, Manufacturing, and Transportation and Storage.  In October 2010, aggregate 
credit grew by 19.69 % which annualizes to 23.63 %. Credit to the private sector grew in July 2009, 
and declined between January and August, 2010 then rose afterwards. By October 2010, credit to the 
private sector, core private sector, and government grew by 3.86, 3.07 and 64.02 percent, 
respectively, on annualized basis.   
New credit to the economy increased from N145,459 million in April 2010 to N173, 807 million in May 
2010, and N345,998 million in June, 2010 representing increases of 19.49% and 99.1% respectively. It, 
however, declined to N322, 275 million in October, 2010, representing a decline of 6.85%. 
The preceding analysis and explanation points to the effectiveness and success of AMCON in Nigeria 
as an important tool in the country’s financial sector restructuring. 
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5.3.4 Improved Sector Liquidity  
AMCON’s purchase of NPLs with tradable zero-coupon FGN bonds has contributed significantly to 
banking sector liquidity, mainly because these bonds qualify for statutory liquidity ratio requirements 
and also remain tradable.  
Since the consolidation of the Nigerian banking sector, overall liquidity has remained robust, 
averaging 52% between 2008 and 2011 and surpassing the CBN threshold of 30% (Ecobank, 2013:7). 
Consequently, the proportion of AMCON bonds was about 34% of total liquid assets as at the third 
quarter of 2012 and contributed about 16% of overall sector liquidity. However, Ecobank noted that if 
AMCON were to suspend its asset purchase programme today and if its contribution to overall 
industry liquidity were stripped off, the underlying industry liquidity could easily fall below the 
statutory 30% threshold. 
 
Figure 5.3: Liquidity-Based Indicators (%) 
 
Source: Ecobank (2013) Adapted 
 
69 
 
5.3.5 Asset Quality and Management of NPLs by AMCON 
After the AMCON intervention, asset quality indicators such as NPL/total loans showed a substantial 
improvement as the ratio declined by 22.5% between June 2010 and December 2010 and by a further 
4.9% by December 2011. Improvements in liquidity were also noticeable with the ratio of core liquid 
assets to total assets showing an increasing trend from 17.2% at June 2010 to 25.7% at December 
2011. Over the same period, the ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities also increased by 11.8% 
that is, from 27.91% to 31.2% (IMF, 2013:10). 
 
While the 2008/09 banking crisis was raging, it was discovered that the quality of disclosure by banks 
was extremely poor. After the CBN audit, about ten banks controlling about 40% of the market were 
found to have more than 35% of the bad loans in the sector. However, various measures by the CBN 
such as the creation of AMCON and improved banking supervision have since seen asset quality 
improve significantly to below the threshold of 5% as at the 2012 year-end (Ecobank, 2013:6).  
 
Alford (2012:14) argued that the non-performing loan ratio for the Nigerian banking industry was 
37.1% in June 2010 but this fell to 10.4% after the issuance of AMCON bonds in exchange for NPLs a 
year later. Alford (2012:14) adds that, in a relatively short time, AMCON successfully removed NPLs 
from the system.  
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Figure 5.4: Asset Quality Indicators 
 
Source: Ecobank (2013) Adapted 
 
5.3.6 Bank Capital Trends 
The bank capital to assets ratio reflects the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Here the 
term “capital and reserves” includes funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and 
special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Similarly, “capital” includes tier 1 capital 
(paid-up shares and common stock), which is a common feature in all countries' banking systems, and 
total regulatory capital, which includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that 
need not be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels (these comprise tier 2 
and tier 3 capital). The term “Total assets” includes all nonfinancial and financial assets. 
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A. Bank capital to assets ratio (%) 
The following analysis of the bank capital ratio as a percentage of total assets also showed positive 
trends after the AMCON intervention. By 2011, the bank capital to assets ratio (%) in Nigeria was 3.90. 
Its highest value over the past eleven years (2002-2013) was 18.50 in 2008, while its lowest value was 
3.20 in 2010. As can be seen in Figure 3.5 below for other bank capital-based indicators such as 
regulatory capital/ RWA and Tier 1 capital/ RWA, regulatory capital – to – RWA grew from 2% in 2010 
to 17.7% in June 2012 while Tier 1 Capital –to – RWA improved from 2.2% to 17.85 over the same 
period.  
Figure 5.5: Capital-Based Indicators (%) 
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B. Concentration Risks Eased 
Ecobank (2013:6) noted that Nigerian banks are now stronger as the 2011 year-end figures showed a 
total qualifying capitalization of NGN1.90 billion ($12bn) and that of total adjusted shareholder funds 
amounting to NGN1.94 billion ($12.25bn). When viewed against the minimum core capital 
requirement of NGN25 billion ($158mn) then this situation is within the acceptable levels of risk for 
the banking industry in Nigeria. Furthermore, Ecobank (2013:7) highlighted that the ratio of Tier 1 
capital/total risk-adjusted assets has also stabilized above the Basel requirement of 8%.  
These trends also support the effectiveness of the AMCON solution to Nigeria’s banking crisis. 
 
5.3.7 Cost Efficiency  
The efficiency of Nigeria’s banking sector continues to stabilize, especially when compared to the 
situation prior to the banking consolidation spurred by AMCON’s establishment. In 2010, the banking 
industry witnessed some prominent consolidations and there were many one-off costs related to 
these acquisitions. The overall effect of these costs is reflected in the sector’s cost-to-income ratio 
which stood at 75.4% by December 2011: the ideal target should not exceed 60% (Ecobank, 2013:6). 
Ecobank reports that the sector’s cost-to-income ratio dropped to about 65% in the first six months of 
2012. As these one-off costs are gradually being integrated, one would expect the cost-to-income 
ratio to stabilize around the threshold of 60% in the coming quarters and one would expect the 
underlying industry efficiency also to normalize. It should be noted that employee costs still account 
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for the largest share of overheads in banks, representing about 45% of total non-interest expenses in 
the first half of 2012.  
The preceding analyses of trends in indicator variables for the capital market, macroeconomic, and 
banking sector, showed that economic conditions in Nigeria stabilized after the AMCON intervention. 
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5.4 Analysis of the Financial Performance and Costs of AMCON 
 
Recently, AMCON announced its audited group financial results for the full year ended 31 December 
2012 (FY2012). This was the Corporation’s second full operational year in which it undertook its 
mandate to stimulate the recovery of the Nigerian financial system.  
The AMCON Group made a total loss after exceptional items of N792 billion for FY2012 and this 
compares with a N2,440 billion  loss for FY2011. The FY2012 loss arose mainly because of the accrued 
“interest and similar expenses” of N561 billion (2011: N243 billion) and asset impairment charges of 
N325 billion (2011: N59 billion) charged during FY2012. The most significant expense under “interest 
and similar expenses” was the bond discount expense of N532 billion, which represents the cost of 
financing the purchase of the Eligible Bank Assets (EBAs). Interest income charged only on 
restructured loans was however not enough to cover the finance cost, which is not uncommon 
bearing in mind the nature of AMCON’s business. It is expected that the gap will be reduced 
moderately in subsequent periods, when the EBAs are restructured and commensurate interest 
income is realized. The asset impairment charges of N325 billion were largely precipitated by non-
collateralized and margin loans purchased by AMCON.6 
 
 
 
6 See “AMCON 2012 Final Accounts” Available at www.amcom.com.ng 
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5.4.1 Key Results for AMCON – 2012 FY     
As reported in the AMCON financial results for FY 2012, the key results are: 
A Balance Sheet - Key Summary 
 Total assets of N2.26 trillion (2011: N1.88 trillion).  
 Total liabilities of N5.45 trillion (2011: N4.24 trillion).  
 AMCON’s issued bonds represent 86% (2011: 99%) of AMCON’s total liabilities. 
 
Refer to the adapted screenshot of the AMCON balance sheet below. 
Figure 5.6: AMCON’s 2012 FYE Balance Sheet 
   
Source: AMCON (2013) 
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B Income Statement – Key Summary 
 
 Gross earnings increased to N42.96 billion (2011: N4.68 billion) representing an increase of 
over 800% from FY2011 to FY 2012. 
 The operating loss of N505.04 billion (2011: N220.05 billion), showed an increase of 130% 
between 2011 and 2012. This increase could be attributed, largely, to an increase in interest 
expense of 139% resulting from an increase in bond coupon accruals. 
 AMCON recorded a loss after tax of N822.97 billion (2011: N2.37 trillion). Thus, the loss after 
tax reduced by 65% in the period FY 2011 to FY 2012. 
 The Corporation incurred a N2.11 trillion loss in 2011 as an exceptional charge as a result of 
the following: mark-to-market losses on Financial Accommodation for Deposit protection 
reasons made to five Intervened Banks; and, the capitalisation of the three Rescued Banks and 
other investments. 
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Figure 5.7: AMCON’s 2012 FYE Profit and Loss Statement 
 
Source: AMCON 
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Figure 5.8: Analysis of AMCON’s 2012 Loss 
 
Source: AMCON 
 
From Figure 5.8 above, it is likely that AMCON over paid for the NPLs it purchased and as such in the 
second year of operation, asset impairment resulting from negotiated loans, non-performing loans 
and revaluation losses constitute 38% of the Net Loss reported by AMCON in its 2012 FY results. What 
is clear though is that AMCON bought four times the volume of non-performing loans that was 
disclosed to on the books of the banks. This is according to a statement by AMCON Executive Director 
of Finance, Mofoluke Dosumu in the Vanguard Newspaper of December 17, 2012.7  
 
7 “The non-performing loans that we bought were four times larger. This shows that what was disclosed as NPLs (non-performing loans) on the books of 
the banks were below what we found when they started selling to us. We bought four times what we initially envisaged.” See 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/amcon-the-bad-bank-and-the-n2-37-trillion-loss/134327/  
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5.5 Moral Hazard and the Fiscal Cost of AMCON to Nigeria  
According to AMCON and as agreed by all the banks, Nigerian banks are bearing the funding costs of 
the exercise as they are paying 0,5% of their total assets as a levy. This levy will span ten years and is 
expected to minimize the financial burden to the taxpayers. In an interview, Bismarck Rewane, CEO of 
Financial Derivatives, states that “even though the fiscal cost of the distress resolution option was in 
excess of N6trillion, in reality the social costs avoided including a run on the banks, far exceeds the 
financial cost. Also the fact that the banks are bearing the financial burden, the taxpayer and fiscal 
costs is reduced to zero.” The stigma of being listed by AMCON and CBN as a rescued bank constitutes 
both a fiscal and social burden. 
 
Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004:22) claim that an asset management company (AMC) can trigger 
bank lending with associated moral hazard whenever the transfer of NPLs to the AMC entails little 
cost to banks. A classic example of this type of moral hazard is when bank executives are confidently 
taking risky investments knowing that they would not bear the burden of their recklessness in case of 
a negative outcome: they believe, however, that in the case of a positive outcome they would be the 
ones to reap the rewards with huge bonuses and other forms of monetary and social gains. This is 
why several researchers argue against bank bailouts. 
 
For example, Rosas (2006:1) argues that the huge costs shouldered by taxpayers, and the attendant 
moral hazard incentives that characterize bank bailouts, call for an explanation of why some 
governments choose to rescue banks when confronted with a systemic banking crisis (“bailout”) while 
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others choose to allow failures of insolvent banks (“Bagehot”). According to Rosas (2006:3), 
governments using the bailout solution (bad bank) are encouraging moral hazard through lengthening 
the lives of insolvent banks unnecessarily. In the same vein, Schäfer and Zimmermann (2009:4) argued 
that the removal of toxic assets from a bank’s books at zero-cost and the corresponding write-down 
of assets help to avoid the high expense of pricing distressed assets which will keep the cost to 
taxpayers low and finally help curtail the risk of moral hazard.  
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5.6 Risks Facing AMCON 
 
AMCON is facing refinancing risks, funding risks, interest rate risks, counterparty credit risks and 
operational risks. Analyses of these risks and suggested mitigating factors are presented in Figure 5.9 
below. 
 
Figure 5.9 Risks Facing AMCON 
 
Source: AMCON (2013) 
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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study investigates the effectiveness of the bad bank solution in addressing the banking crisis in 
Nigeria through a balanced assessment of Africa’s first bad bank, the Asset Management Corporation 
of Nigeria (AMCON), and its role in resolving non-performing loans in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. This study is important because Nigeria’s economy, the largest in Africa, is powered by 
its banking sector. The intervention of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was thus crucial to the 
survival of this sector.  
 
Implementation of this bad bank solution was effective. The decline in the level of non- performing 
loans (NPLs) was rapid, particularly in the banking sector. NPLs expressed as a percentage of total 
loans in the banking sector declined from 27.6 percent in 2009 to 4.3 percent by June 2012. We found 
that the balance-sheet sanitization effort by the CBN has helped to neutralize many of the sector’s 
NPLs, and spurred improvements in the sector’s aggregate loan book quality from 28% in 2009 to 
4.3% as at the second quarter of 2012. The capital market and the GDP growth over the period under 
consideration all showed a positive trend after AMCON was formed. Particularly, after the 
intervention of AMCON in 2010, the banking industry ratio of non-performing loans to total credit 
reduced from 34.4% in November 2010 to 4.95 % at the end of 2011.  We acknowledge however that 
the improvement in the GDP and the all-share index could be due to other factors besides AMCON.  
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Overall, we argue that the AMCON solution was effective in addressing the banking crisis in Nigeria as 
it led to the cleaning-up of the sector and it gave Nigerian banks the leeway to concentrate on 
building new and sustainable lending models.  
 
While AMCON improved the affected banks’ balance sheets so banks could focus on lending to the 
real economy and thereby supporting economic growth, our analysis reveals that the cost of the bad 
bank solution has been huge. According to media reports8, Dr. Biodun Adedipe, a financial expert, said 
that “AMCON’s debt is a contingent liability to the government, since AMCON’s bonds are backed by 
the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), which implies that in the event of a default, the 
government will have to settle AMCON’s creditors.” Despite this however, we note that at this point, 
there is no adverse moral hazard effect on financial institutions.  
 
AMCON’s work is not yet finished: it still needs to dispose of all distressed assets acquired. AMCON 
has, in the past three years, redeemed bonds on four occasions without default and it plans to 
redeem an additional N800 billion’s worth of bonds this year (2014).  
 
The financial performance of AMCON has been mixed and it has been running at a huge loss. The 
huge asset impairment charges and revaluation losses reported on its financials suggest that AMCON 
probably overpaid for the NPLs that it acquired.  
 
 
8 AMCON - Stakeholders bicker over lifespan, performance. See http://allafrica.com/stories/201405260301.html 
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In support of this view, the economist Henry Boyo expressed in one of his articles and quoted in a 
media report9: “that AMCON appeared to have been stampeded to pay for those toxic debts before it 
even considered the need for proper valuation of the acquired assets; and that AMCON has only lately 
begun ascertaining the real values of the assets acquired almost three years ago.” It remains to be 
seen when and how AMCON will eventually turn around its losses as well as its negative equity which 
is currently at N3.2trillion. These observations do not negate AMCON’s contribution to the resolution 
of the Nigerian financial sector crisis. They only indicate that the pricing of NPLs during a financial 
crisis has been and will remain the most difficult challenge for any publicly-owned AMC. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
First, AMCON’s operations should be focused primarily on restructuring the purchased Eligible Bank 
Assets (EBAs) and meeting its debt obligations: any failure to accomplish this would imply that the 
nation’s equity market and the entire economy is in danger of facing yet another severe crisis.  
 
Second, AMCON should have a clearly defined lifespan, in order to deliver on its mandate successfully. 
This is in line with global best practices. Thus, the amendment to the AMCON Enabling Act, giving it 
perpetual life, could trigger adverse moral hazard effects.  
 
 
9
 Stakeholders worry over AMCON time-bomb, call for checks. See http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/04/stakeholders-worry-over-amcon-time-
bomb-call-for-checks/ 
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The author also supports the call by the International Monetary Fund in its Article IV Consultation 
Report for 2012 that the Nigerian government should wind down AMCON within seven years. 
However to do this effectively, AMCON must put in place an effective exit strategy so that the gains 
from the bad bank solution can be reaped.  
Third and last: to minimize costs to taxpayers, it is recommended that the government stake in 
AMCON should be sold to the private sector. This would ensure a commercial orientation, thereby 
creating incentives to focus on core competencies, economize on operating costs, and maximize 
profits and efficiency. Government intervention should be limited to supporting the private bad bank 
by implementing asset guarantees in an attempt to reassure depositors as in the case of the Citibank 
example. 
 
6.3 Areas for further study 
AMCON is now into its third year of operation and this review covers only this time period. A 
comprehensive review of AMCON’s operation over a period of five to ten years would have made our 
findings regarding AMCON’s performance and effectiveness more valid.  
Also, the future assessment of AMCON’s performance should also be analysed from both the cash 
recovery and asset disposal standpoints.   
A review is also needed to ascertain how AMCON will manage its bond liabilities and minimise losses 
from further bond redemption and to determine whether a government guarantee will be its final 
resort. 
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